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Abstract 
This disseration focuses on the analysis of retail interest rate differentials across the euro area 
countries and tries to identify their underlying reasons and their implications as well. In this 
context we pay attention on the local nature of retail banking which sufficiently describes the 
heterogeneity of retail banking market and the divergence of retail financial products and 
services rates. The available literature points out that despite the introduction of the common 
currency European banking sector is still fragmented. This situation has been further deteriorated 
owing to the recent economic crisis across the euro area. We examine through the use of 
descriptive statistics the course of the composite cost-of-borrowing indicator and confirm the 
aforementioned findings. 
Key words: retail interest rate differentials, retail banking integration, divergence, heterogeneity, 
composite cost-of-borrowing indicator 
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Introduction 
The introduction of the single currency signaled a new economic environment and altered the 
conditions under which monetary policy is conducted in the euro area. This vital step towards 
EMU though generated extensive discussions over the observed heterogeneity of the national 
banking sectors across the euro area countries. In response, several studies placed emphasis on 
the fact that cross-country differences in financial structure may lead to asymmetric effects of the 
single monetary policy thereby further complicating its implementation. Special attention has 
been also devoted to the extent to which national banking sectors behave heterogeneously 
concerning the pricing of retail bank interest rates under a common monetary policy regime. 
Owing to the key position of the banking sector at the centre of the euro area financial system the 
pricing of retail banking products, e.g. loans and deposits, is a crucial element concerning 
monetary policy transmission mechanism. In particular, the empirical literature questions 
whether there exists a heterogeneous pass-through process which in turn induces asymmetric 
monetary policy transmission. The majority of these studies document that the degree and speed 
of pass-through is different across countries as well as across banking products.  
Despite the initial expectations, the current situation in the euro area financial market is 
described and summarized by the phrase integrated wholesale markets, fragmented retail 
markets. From a monetary policy perspective, it should be highlighted that it had been assumed 
that the observed asymmetries regarding the pass-through process would be outweighed by the 
financial integration that the single currency would induce and the convergence of the financial 
structure that the regime by itself would trigger. However, the available literature (Kleimeier & 
Sander, 2002; Schuler & Heinemann, 2002; Cabral, et al., 2002; Baele, et al., 2004; Walkner & 
Raes, 2005; Kleimeier & Sander, 2006; Affinito & Farabullini, 2006; Kok Sørensen & Gutiérrez, 
2006; Vajanne, 2007; Rughoo & Sarantis, 2014) provides evidence that this process is not 
without obstacles. In practice, the initial expected integration of the euro area economies has not 
been achieved yet to the extent that had been predicted by the adherents of this view. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that incomplete integration of retail banking is stressed by the majority of the 
empirical studies. In practice, the lack of integration of retail markets is reflected in limited 
convergence of retail interest rates suggesting insufficient competition. Indeed, the implication of 
bank competition for the conduct of monetary policy is decisive because if banks operate in a 
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weak competitive environment monetary policy changes are likely to be transmitted less 
forcefully than under the situation of full competition. Thus, weak competition is the major 
obstacle to further financial integration. However, the integration of retail banking markets is 
expected to be intensified in the near future, without meeting though, the vision of the full 
integration that the single market project generated. In fact, the main reason lying behind the 
heterogeneity of national retail banking markets among the euro area is the strong local nature of 
retail banking activities. Consequently, despite the measures that have been taken targeting 
financial integration and bank competition, retail banking markets are still fragmented. It 
becomes apparent that as long as the local nature of retail banking remains an important 
determinant of the transmission mechanism, the single monetary policy is likely to be 
implemented in a heterogeneous euro area and retail interest rate differentials are unlikely to be 
eliminated. Moreover, the low level of retail banking integration has been further deteriorated 
owing to the recent crisis of the euro area. The available data suggest that the euro area retail has 
experienced a re-emergence of segmentation. It is interesting that retail banking markets were 
initially less affected by the European and global financial turmoil because of their fragmented 
structure. In practice, the financial crisis had a quite clear negative impact on retail banking 
integration. 
In summary the evidence in the available literature suggest a fragmented retail banking market 
across the euro area, whereas retail banking integration process is slow and unstable. In this 
context, the purpose of this dissertation is to identify the underlying reasons of the observed 
retail interest rate differentials and to assess the state of euro area retail banking integration. The 
length of the dissertation does not allow for an extensive analysis of the different retail banking 
products, so we focus on an overall assessment of retail banking services. The structure of the 
dissertation is the following: the first chapter briefly presents some key aspects of the financial 
system of the euro area. The second chapter presents the definition of financial integration and a 
set of financial integration indicators. The third chapter assesses the current state of retail 
banking integration and describes the literature review. The forth chapter identifies the linkages 
between pass-through, integration and bank competition in the context of monetary policy. The 
fifth chapter examines the course and the evolution of financial integration on the basis of a 
price-based indicator, the composite cost-of-borrowing indicator, developed by the European 
Central Bank. The last chapter concludes and summarizes the dissertation.  
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1. The banking system of the euro area 
Bank lending plays a critical role in Europe as it provides funds to the corporate, private, and 
public sector. According to the report of European Commission (2014) concerning European 
financial stability and integration, the EU banking system in terms of size, concentration and 
cross border ownership is very different among EU members. In particular in most EU members 
the total assets of national banking systems exceed GDP by two to four times. The size of the 
banks is much higher in countries such as Luxembourg, Malta, Cyprus and Ireland, whereas 
these countries’ bank size is followed by the UK, Denmark, France and the Netherlands. On the 
contrary countries such as Romania, Lithuania and Poland have considerably smaller banks 
compared to GDP. However given the existence of cross-border financial conglomerates the 
domestic size of banking system does not play such a vital role. In practice the domestic size of 
the banking system must be considered in combination with the assets held by foreign banks. In 
this context the EU banking system can be divided in three different categories of business 
models. The first model refers to Central and Eastern European countries that have a small sized 
banking system which is dominated by foreign ownership (more than 50%). The second business 
model refers to countries with a long banking tradition that are dominated by domestic banks. 
The third model is represented by countries that play the role of financial hubs that have very 
large banking systems in which foreign banks have a strong presence. Concerning retail banking 
it is highlighted that retail banking activities require banks to be located close to their customers. 
So, domestic banks provide the most of the loans to households and non-financial corporations. 
Given the local nature of retail banking financial integration in retail activities is achieved 
foreign ownership of banks in domestic market rather that cross border provision of retail 
banking services. 
The fragmented retail banking market is a very important feature of the banking system in the 
euro area. This feature though appears to be an endogenous and integral component of retail 
banking which rests on the local nature of retail banking activities. The integration process of 
retail banking is slower in that area of financial market. Besides, the emergence of the euro area 
has favored the convergence of retail banking products interest rates, but considerable 
differences have remained across euro area members suggesting a strong segmentation. More in 
particular, retail banking represents the traditional business of banks. In this context banks’ 
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customers are mainly households or small corporations. Retail banking traditional core activity is 
the intermediation between those who save and those who want to borrow. So, retail banking 
products encompasses the traditional loan and deposit types (consumer credit, mortgages, 
commercial loans, savings deposit accounts). So the retail banking market differs from wholesale 
and capital market-related products in two main elements. First, the proximity of banks to its 
retail customers is crucial because this type of customers has little mobility and hence 
distribution networks play an important role in retail banking. Second, retail banking market is 
highly diversified because it includes numerous small banks and huge financial conglomerates 
that offer a wide range of different credit (Cabral et al. 2002). In this context, as long as the local 
nature of retail banking remains the integration process will be slow and the financial structure 
will remain heterogeneous.   
As the report of ESBG (2009) highlights any comprehensive discussion on market integration 
should take into account that the euro area markets for retail banking products and services are 
characterized by diversity. This diversity should be illustrated in order to get an insight of the 
current situation of retail financial services market. The fact that the main provider of retail 
financial products and services in EU are banks which comply with EU banking regulations, 
does not imply a common European banking model. In practice, European banks differ 
concerning their organizational structure, size, profitability, orientation and ownership. Actually 
instead of a European banking model, a European pluralistic model of a banking sector is in 
place. Indeed, the variety of retail options for banking is impressive reflecting multiple European 
banking traditions. More in particular, retail banking market in Europe follows three core 
models, namely commercial banks, cooperative banks and savings banks, which are not mutually 
exclusive though. These three core models represent different approaches towards banking. 
Overall this rich diversity is a crucial aspect for any cross-European assessment. Moreover, the 
diversity of Europe’s retail banking markets implies there is not any single market structure but a 
variety of market structures. This fact is important in the context of retail market integration as 
there is no recipe for a harmonic and integrated retail banking sector. In practice, policies that 
push forward further integration of retail financial services market must incorporate the local 
dimension feature of retail banking. Indeed, the proximity and accessibility between the provider 
of retail financial services and the customer is fundamental. The local character of retail banking 
should be taken into consideration when market integration strategies are designed end 
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implemented. The local character of retail banking business actually depends on the strong local 
demand for retail banking products and services. Indeed, despite the significant similarities 
across European countries households and SMEs demand for retail services is affected by 
domestic economic conditions, traditions and other factors. This implies that retail banking 
business differs across countries and hence successful strategies are local. Owing to these 
differences retail banking products and services are not homogeneous. So, demand is driven by 
local conditions and circumstances. The local nature of retail banking has important implications 
for retail banking integration. Indeed, as long as cross-border banking refers to a situation that 
providers and customers are placed in different countries, retail market integration through cross-
border provision of retail financial products and services will be limited to neighboring countries. 
Moreover, if integration refers to the establishment of branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks 
to a European country then foreign banks have to adapt to local business environment and cannot 
transfer their own domestic business model. In addition, the successful penetration and entry to a 
domestic retail banking market requires great investments which are discouraging, especially for 
mature and competitive markets. 
 
 
2. Definition and measurement of financial integration 
Many studies have defined financial integration taking into consideration the concept of the “law 
of one price”. In particular, this broadly used definition assumes that two markets are integrated 
when identical goods or assets are priced equally across borders. In the context of financial 
products and services under the law of one price retail banking products, after the completion of 
the integration progress, should be priced identically. More in particular, the Cecchini Report 
(1998) adopting an optimistic scenario of perfect mobility of capital and identical conditions of 
risk, assumed that in a situation of complete financial integration the law of one price would hold 
and hence interest rates would fully converge.  
According to Baele et al. (2004) an integrated financial market can be defined on the basis of 
three characteristics. More in particular: 
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“The market for a given set of financial instruments and/or services is fully integrated if all 
potential market participants with the same relevant characteristics (1) face a single set of 
rules when they decide to deal with those financial instruments and/or services; (2) have 
equal access to the above-mentioned set of financial instruments and/or services; and (3) are 
treated equally when they are active in the market” (Baele et al., 2004: 6).  
This particular definition of financial integration includes three fundamental features. First, it is 
not based on the financial structures across different countries. It is not surprising for different 
countries to retain the differences of their different financial structures, namely all financial 
intermediaries, markets and institutions that interact in order to fund households, corporations 
and governments. Even after integration these different structures are not likely to converge. 
Second, financial integration does not necessarily imply that the process of intermediation will 
be without frictions that impede the optimal allocation of capital. Indeed, financial integration 
place emphasis on the effects of those frictions on different countries rather than removing these 
frictions. Phrased differently financial integration can be achieved in the presence of frictions if 
they have a symmetric impact on different countries. Third, the definition of financial integration 
of Baele et al. implies that full integration requires equal access to financial services for both 
investors and firms regardless of their origin. That means that full integration rules out 
discrimination for investment opportunities among market participants. Overall Baele et al. argue 
that their definition includes the law of one price. In particular, if the law of one price does not 
hold, namely if financial services are not priced identically, there would be room for arbitrage 
opportunities. However, if there is no discrimination, market participants would exploit those 
arbitrage opportunities and hence they would restore the law of one price. The authors underline 
though that on one hand the law of one price allows for quantitative measures, but one the other 
hand it ignores some crucial aspects of financial integration.  
This definition by Beale et al. (2004) actually refers to the definition for financial integration 
adopted by the ECB. More in particular: 
“The ECB has adopted a definition of financial integration: it considers the market for a 
given set of financial instruments or services to be fully integrated when all potential market 
participants in such a market (i) are subject to a single set of rules when they decide to deal 
with those financial instruments or services, (ii) have equal access to this set of financial 
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instruments or services, and (iii) are treated equally when they operate in the market”. (ECB, 
2007:5). 
However it should be highlighted that according to Sander and Kleimeier (2001) the law of one 
price is not a good indicator for measuring retail banking integration. Indeed, retail banking 
interest rates reflects country-specific differences and hence they cannot be equalized. Actually 
the law of one price can be valid only for financial markets that provide homogeneous products 
and are characterized by perfect mobility. Retail banking products do not meet these criteria 
though. Besides, the aforementioned local nature of retail banking does not allow the arbitrage 
process to take place properly and equalize retail interest rates. Consequently it becomes 
apparent that the law of one price cannot capture the concept of retail banking integration. In 
practice a proper benchmark for measuring the degree of integration in this particular banking 
market should take into consideration cross-country differences. Clearly retail interest rates 
cannot be strictly comparable across the euro area.   
2.1 Financial integration indicators 
Drawing on the available literature (Baele et al., 2005, Cabral et al., 2002, Adam et al., 2002) 
several financial integration indicators have been highlighted. In particular these indicators can 
be divided into three categories, namely price-based indicators, quantity-based indicators and 
other indicators. More in particular: 
The first broad category of measures refers to price-based indicators. These indicators measure 
discrepancies in prices or returns on assets and are directly connected to the law of one price, 
which in supposed to hold in case that financial integration is complete. If retail banking 
products have adequately similar characteristics the comparisons can be made on the basis of 
price. Otherwise differences in several characteristics have to be taken into consideration. This 
type of indicators is preferable towards other types of indicators as they depend on comparable 
and reliable available data. In addition, they are easy to be computed and informative since they 
can be employed to test several hypotheses. Given these considerations a number of price-based 
integration indicators can be constructed, such as composite indicator of the cost of borrowing 
for non-financial corporations and households, σ-convergence and β-convergence which are 
based on a cross-sectional dispersion of interest rates spreads, and banks’ margins. If the 
hypothesis that financial integration makes the return of financial assets more similar holds then 
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a decrease in cross-sectional dispersion would emerge and interest rates would converge. These 
indicators show the degree and the speed to which financial markets are integrated. 
The second broad category of measures refers to quantity-based indicators. This type of 
indicators is less accurate compared to price-based measures but it is still valuable for measuring 
financial integration. Under a situation of retail banking integration cross-border banking activity 
would be considerably enhanced, but still cross-border banking activity is not a precondition for 
financial market integration. Moreover, given the threat of entry by foreign banks, the law of one 
price may hold even in the absence of cross-border banking activity. Despite these limitations, 
quantity-based indicators can be helpful in accessing financial integration across the euro area 
banking sector. In particular, these indicators encompass cross-border activities, namely the 
volumes of cross-border loans to non-banks and interbank loans. The progress toward integration 
would imply that barriers to foreign banking activity are removed and hence the aforementioned 
volumes would be increased as foreigners access domestic credit market without being 
physically present. So, cross-border flows in retail deposits and loans have been implemented to 
evaluate the degree of financial integration. The most reliable quantity-based indicator is the 
number of cross-border M&As as merging with or acquiring a domestic bank implies a certain 
degree of progress towards financial integration. Apart from M&As, banks can also penetrate a 
foreign banking market through subsidiaries and hence the number of foreign banks and their 
market share can be used as an additional quantity-based indicator of financial integration. 
The third broad category of measures refers to other indicators. This category includes news-
based measures of integration. In particular, in financially integrated area regional news are not 
expected to have a considerable impact on retail banking product prices, whereas global news are 
expected to be more significant presupposing that risk is identical across financial assets in 
different countries.  
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3. Assessment of the current retail banking integration 
According to the latest ECB’s financial integration report (2014), the integration of banking 
markets, namely lending and deposit activities, exhibits only limited improvement since the peak 
of the European sovereign debt crisis in mid-2012. Indeed, some banks have restored their cross-
border activities but they are still lower when compared to the activities before the financial 
crisis. The high financial fragmentation is reflected on the considerably high divergence of the 
borrowing cost for non-financial companies (particularly SMEs) across the euro zone. This 
divergence has a very negative impact on monetary and economic policy. In this unstable 
financial environment the confidence in the euro zone banking sector must be restored through a 
banking union which is very likely to foster the restoration of cross-border credit flows and the 
convergence of bank lending rates.  
Taking into consideration the prices of certain financial services and products and using 
composite indicators of the cost of borrowing for non-financial corporations and households’ 
house purchases the ECB’s financial integration report (2014) estimates the degree of banking 
integration. Given the still unfolding financial crisis, the ECB report divides the euro zone in two 
broad categories, namely distressed and non-distressed countries. Unsurprisingly, the composite 
indicator for non-financial corporations exhibit that since the eruption of the financial crisis the 
borrowing costs in distressed and in non-distressed countries have been progressively diverged. 
Furthermore, the spread between the average interest rate in distressed countries and the ECB’s 
interest rate on the main refinancing operations (MROs) has been broadened, while in the same 
time this spread remained relatively unchanged in non-distressed countries. Plausibly, these 
findings indicate that the euro area banking markets are progressively less integrated. In practice, 
owing to country-specific macroeconomic risks, companies do not enjoy equal access to funding 
in all euro zone members and hence the divergence of the lending rates. This trend though is not 
evident in house purchases by households as mortgage lending rates do not diverge between 
distressed and non-distressed countries. More in particular, cross-country bank lending rates 
dispersion is larger to small loans. This feature is crucial though because small loans refer to 
SMEs (small and medium-sized enterprises) which play a very special role in economic activity 
in many distressed euro zone countries. Moreover, the development of interest rates deposits for 
non-financial corporations and households is an additional indicator for financial integration in 
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the euro zone. In particular, before the eruption of financial crisis the deposit rates of monetary 
financial institutions (MFI) were following the ECB main refinancing operations. However, after 
the outbreak of the crisis deposit rates for non-financial corporations and households diverged 
from the ECB’s MRO rates in both group of countries. However, deposit rates in distressed 
countries have been increased more sharply in comparison to non-distressed countries. This 
feature is explained by the fact that MFIs in distressed countries had to offer higher deposit rates 
in order to attract depositors as their access to funding markets has been reduced. It should be 
highlighted though that in 2013 deposit rates exhibited a decreasing rate suggesting that MFIs’ 
funding conditions had been eased.  
It is well known that banks can operate either locally or across borders. So, a growing cross 
border business activity of the euro area banks suggests that banking markets are more integrated 
and harmonized. In that framework, the ECB’s financial integration report (2014) points out that 
the share of non-domestic euro area subsidiaries and branches to all banks operating euro area 
countries remained stable during the period 2009-2013. However, it is worth mentioned that the 
total number of non-domestic euro area subsidiaries and branches has been declined. This 
development is in line with the trend of dropping euro area bank affiliates. Furthermore, the 
share of total assets and total loans of non-domestic euro area affiliates has been reduced in the 
same period, but still the differences between euro area countries are huge. Indeed, in large 
countries the aforementioned share is below 10%, whereas small countries share is above 80%. 
Moreover, taking into consideration the cross-border interbank lending market the ECB’s 
financial integration report notes that the share of cross-border interbank loans to total loans has 
been declined after the Lehman crisis below. Moreover, cross-border loans to households as 
share of total mortgages is only 1% and hence it is not worth mentioned, whereas cross-border 
loans to non-financial corporations is less than 8%. As far as the liability side of banks is 
concerned over 50% of euro area banks’ liabilities are deposits, which are their main funding 
source. During the 2000s till 2013 domestic deposits have been increased more in distressed 
countries in comparison to non-distressed countries, whereas deposits to MFIs in other euro area 
countries exhibit a similar trend. In particular, in distressed countries cross-border deposits are 
only 3% of total deposits while in non-distressed countries account for 7%. Overall, the national 
reduction of assets and liabilities can be attributed to factors such as turbulent foreign banking 
markets, revised business strategies, deleveraging, alteration in risk preferences and regulatory 
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incentives towards domestic business. Moreover, as the ECB’s financial integration report 
(2014) notes, the provision of payment services is an important fraction of euro area banking 
business given the regular revenues that provide to banks. The European retail payments market 
was highly fragmented but currently this market becomes more homogenized reducing the cost 
of cross-country operations for payment service providers and users and encouraging cross-
border banking competition.  
3.1 Euro zone retail banking: the way forward 
In response to the economic crisis that erupted in 2008, numerous initiatives took place in order 
to create sounder and more stable financial sector for the euro area. In particular, the initiative to 
build a European banking union, announced by the heads of state of the euro zone in June 2012, 
aims to achieve two objectives: firstly, to promote and deepen the single market in financial 
services and, secondly, to break toxic interactions between weak banks and weak states in order 
to help overcome the crisis in the euro zone. This proposed approach is divided into three stages: 
first, the creation of a single supervisory mechanism, second, the creation of a single resolution 
mechanism for banks, and thirdly, in the indefinite future, some kind of a deposit guarantee 
scheme in the euro zone. But this gradual creation of the banking union raises questions. It is 
considered that this three-stage approach is questionable. It is much easier to agree on the 
establishment of a single supervisory mechanism, rather than taking the next steps towards 
deeper banking integration which may involve financial commitments or loss of sovereignty over 
decisions relating to national financial institutions. Moreover, given the current conditions, the 
implementation of the first stage is technically easier. The creation of a single resolution 
mechanism for banks and a deposit guarantee scheme also require changes to European treaties 
or signing new treaties that would require unanimous consent. So the second and third stage of 
the banking union is technically difficult to achieve and requires the willingness of the euro area 
Member States to delegate part of their sovereign to multilateral institutions (Herring, 2013).  
In any case, these developments are particularly important for the structure of the euro zone. In 
the early 2000s European banks development was comparable to the new economic environment 
of the euro area. But when the financial crisis emerged in 2008 it became apparent that while the 
rescue and supervision of banks had remained a national governments’ responsibility, the size of 
banks was disproportionately large compared to the fiscal capacity of the euro area members. 
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This created a vicious cycle between banks and sovereigns. Under these circumstances, the 
banking union could provide a mechanism for absorbing the impact of asymmetric shocks in the 
euro zone and it break the vicious circle between sovereign debt crisis and banking crisis. 
However the mechanism of rescuing banks is characterized by a problematic and slow decision-
making process and insufficient funds. Furthermore, the heterogeneity of the economies of the 
euro zone does not refer only to the fragmentation of national banking systems but extends in 
many macroeconomic and structural parameters. Therefore, the banking union cannot eliminate 
asymmetric shocks and guarantee a smooth function for the euro area financial system (Enria, 
2013). 
 
4.  Literature review 
An overview of the literature reveals a mixed picture concerning the studies that examine the 
process of retail banking integration in the euro area. In particular, some of the earlier studies 
(Kleimeier & Sander, 20002; Schuler & Heinemann, 2002) conduct co-integration analysis on 
interest rate spreads. Other studies (Vajanne, 2007; Kleimeier & Sander, 2006) use β- and σ- 
convergence tests in order to estimate the degree and speed of convergence in retail banking. The 
remaining studies (Affinito &Farabullini, 2006; Kok Sørensen & Gutiérrez, 2006; Rughoo & 
Sarantis, 2014) apply other methodological approaches. The following part reviews the 
aforementioned literature. 
Kleimeier & Sanders (2002) examined the development of integration in retail banking markets. 
The authors review the policies towards the creation of single market for financial services and 
underline the effort to overcome the heterogeneity in European banking. At these early steps of 
the euro zone Kleimeier & Sanders observe that interbank and wholesale markets are integrated, 
whereas the integration of retail banking markets is questionable. In particular they point out that 
bank lending is a domestic banking activity while the market share of foreign European banks is 
insignificant when compared to the total assets of domestic banks. So the evidence could not 
support the emergence of a Europe-wide banking system. Besides, mergers and acquisitions 
(M&As) were taking place domestically as the total value of domestic M&As was much higher 
in comparison to cross-border M&As. These findings suggested that the typical EU bank was 
still a domestic bank. Despite the limited cross-border bank lending and M&As lending rates 
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across Europe has been converged. Kleimeier & Sanders do not consider that interest rate 
convergence equals market integration. They empirically investigated the state of integration and 
ascertained a limited integration process, which has been fostered though by the introduction of 
the common European currency. More in particular, three key retail interest rates, namely 
mortgage loans to households, consumer loans to households and lending to the corporate sector, 
shows that during the period 1995-2000 these key retail interest rates has been converged both in 
nominal and real terms. However, it would be misleading if this convergence was attributed to an 
integrated banking market as the impact of the single monetary policy is critical concerning 
banking rates convergence. So, Kleimeier & Sanders conducted a co-integration analysis on 
interest rate spreads for different retail banking products, rejecting the “law of one price” and 
allowing differences in the underlying credit characteristics. Co-integration means that a long-
run relationship between interest rates across countries exists. The authors did not find any 
evidence for European retail banking market for mortgages and consumer lending, whereas 
corporate lending appears to be more integrated but it is still questionable. These finding are in 
line with the local nature of retail banking. Kleimeier & Sanders though admit that these finding 
do not capture the still unfolding impact of the single currency on banking system unification as 
the sample period 1995-2000 does not sufficiently covers the EMU period.  
Schüler & Heinemann (2003) applying a similar methodology examine the degree of retail 
banking integration analyzing four lending markets and two deposit markets and testing for co-
integration between national interest rate spreads. In particular the retail banking products that 
are examined are consumer loans to households, mortgage loans to households, medium and 
long-term loans to enterprises, short-term loans to enterprises, time deposits, and savings 
accounts. The authors suggested that retail financial markets across countries are heterogeneous 
owing to factors such as country-specific risk differences, bank behavior and cultural influences 
on banking activity. Given these differences retail banking rates are not expected to equalize 
even in an integrated market and hence the law of one price cannot hold. However, Schüler & 
Heinemann argued that retail banking will be taking place in an increasingly integrating area. 
More in particular, the authors found little evidence for co-integration for mortgage loans to 
households, whereas for the market for consumer loans no evidence for co-integration was 
found. Short-term, medium and long-term loans to enterprises were found to be more integrated 
though. Moreover, little evidence for integration was found for savings market, whereas time 
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deposits markets appeared to be more integrated.  In conclusion, Schüler & Heinemann argue 
that despite the fact that a single money market has been created after the introduction of single 
European currency, integration in retail financial markets has not been achieved yet as they 
revealed substantial fragmentation. The authors though claim that despite the existing underlying 
obstacles and a certain degree of segmentation, there is potential for further integration in retail 
financial markets. 
Vajanne (2007) argues that after the introduction of the single currency there has been a 
substantial progress towards integrated financial services. However, the degree of integration is 
not the same for all financial markets segment. In particular, retail banking markets are less 
integrated in comparison to other financial markets. In practice, retail financial services are still 
provided domestically and cross border lending activity is insignificant. So the retail banking 
products that consumers enjoy differ substantially among euro zone member countries. More in 
particular this paper assess the speed and degree of retail banking integration for the period 
2003-2006 using harmonized interest rates across euro area member countries, and employing 
two common tests of convergence, namely β- and σ-convergence; σ-convergence measures 
whether or not national interest rates have become more similar and β-convergence measures the 
speed of the converge of national interest rates. The tests that Vajanne conducted provide 
evidence that support a continuous process of convergence of interest rates in retail banking. 
Despite the existing cross country differences in lending rates across the euro zone countries, the 
convergence of interest rates is observable according to the authors, whereas the speed of 
convergence varies among different retail financial products. During the period 2003-2006 the 
spreads of large loans to non-financial corporations exhibit a fast convergence. This is attributed 
to the fact that banks compete each other in an environment that was previously restricted. Even 
in the absence of cross border retail banking the threat of foreign banks entry to domestic 
markets pushes the spreads closer to each other. Similarly to large loans to firms, short-term 
housing loans are also integrated in the euro area but the convergence in that category has been 
occurred already before the sample period. On the other hand long-term consumer credits for 
households have converged quickly but the differences of interest rates remain considerable. In 
general, as Vajanne points out large interest rates differences are diminished faster than small 
differences. Furthermore, consumer credit interest rates differences remain significantly high 
across euro zone countries.  
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Kleimeier & Sander (2006) argue that five years after the introduction of the single currency the 
existing evidence highlight a fragmented retail banking markets which maintains strong national 
characteristics. The observed convergence of retail banking markets can be attributed to the 
impact of the single monetary policy. However that means, according to the authors, that without 
further structural changes it is likely that the convergence process will slow down. Overall, 
despite the observed signs of a more integrated retail banking market in the euro area, those 
banking activities remain local. Kleimeier & Sander employed β- convergence and σ-
convergence tests and they found that mortgage and short-term corporate loan markets have been 
mainly converged before the introduction of the common currency. This implies that the driving 
forces of retail banking integration were macro-economic rather than micro-economic. The fact 
that euro area results of σ- and β-convergence indicate convergence is mainly connected to a 
global process of financial integration rather than to euro area-specific processes that promote 
the single banking market. The authors note that these results draw a pessimistic picture of the 
retail banking integration as full convergence of retail interest rates has not been achieved yet. 
They point out thought that it would be surprising if in a market with different retail banking 
products and different lender and borrower behavior, interest rates were equal. In practice simple 
price-convergence measures do not fit the euro zone and hence they cannot capture retail 
banking integration.  
Affinito & Farabullini (2009) asses retail banking integration measuring price convergence and 
testing the law of one price. The emphasis of this paper is placed on interest rate categories and 
on countries as well, namely the authors are investigating which interest rate categories converge 
across euro area and which countries are becoming more uniform and similar. Their analysis is 
based on two methodological approaches, namely statistical tests of equality of country 
coefficients and stationarity tests. Their paper concludes that interest rates differ and retail 
banking markets are still segmented as banking services are not homogeneous across euro area 
countries. So, the law of one price is not valid in the euro area. However, econometric results 
suggest that in those cases that bank customer have market power and good information interest 
rates tend to be more converged across the euro area. In particular, this is mainly the case for 
corporations in comparison to households and large corporations in comparison to small firms. 
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Kok Sørensen & Gutiérrez (2006) apply hierarchical cluster analysis techniques in order to 
examine financial integration in the euro area and primarily banking integration. Cluster analysis 
allowed the authors to develop an alternative tool to traditional measures of financial integration, 
such as the law of one price. In particular, they examined the extent of cross-country 
homogeneity or phrased differently they investigate the area countries that “cluster” together in 
terms of economic and financial structures. Moreover, they examined the evolution of the 
clustering over time during the period 1998-2004. The paper concludes, based on banking-
related variables, that the euro area members overall have become more homogenous since the 
introduction of the common currency. However, significant differences are still documented and 
hence they leave scope for further integration. An important finding refers to the clustering of 
countries; Western and Central European countries (Germany, France, Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands, Belgium) and South European countries (Spain, Portugal, Greece) form two distinct 
clusters. 
Rughoo & Sarantis (2014) examine the integration process of retail banking sector placing 
emphasis on deposit and lending rates for the period 2003-2011, whereas they investigate the 
impact of the 2008 financial crisis on retail banking integration. Rughoo & Sarantis contribute to 
the literature by applying a panel convergence methodology which has not been employed in the 
area of retail banking convergence. The findings of the paper indicate that during the period 
2003-2007 the convergence process is mainly evident for the deposit markets, whereas consumer 
credit markets and mortgage markets, despite their slight convergence, are still heterogeneous. 
However, the impact of the global crisis in 2008 and the euro zone sovereign crisis was crucial. 
Indeed, in contrast to the period 2003-2007, no convergence is evident for deposit, consumer 
credit and mortgage rates for the period 2008–2011. Actually the crisis abruptly halted the 
integration process of retail banking in deposit markets, whereas the existing barriers and 
fragmentation in consumer credit and mortgage markets had been further aggravated. In 
conclusion, the paper of Rughoo & Sarantis point out a reversal in the retail banking integration 
process and highlight the cross-country asymmetries and the heterogeneity of retail banking 
markets. Furthermore, they point out that countries with low credit ratings and increasing default 
risk such as Greece, Spain and Italy, experience a further national fragmentation.  
 
21 
 
5. Linkages between pass-through, integration and bank competition 
As it has been mentioned before there is a strong linkage between retail banking integration, 
pass-through process and bank competition. This chapter investigates this linkage. In particular, 
the integration of financial markets in the euro area and particular in retail banking markets is 
critical also in terms of monetary policy. Indeed, a retail banking integration would allow a 
smooth function for the transmission mechanism of monetary policy because of bank lending 
rates that would properly respond to monetary policy impulses (Borio and Fritz, 1995).  In 
practice a highly responsive retail interest rate pass-through process would facilitate the 
transmission of monetary policy. So, owing to the bank dependence of the European financial 
system, retail banking integration is crucial in terms of monetary policy (de Bondt, 2002).  
The available literature points out though the heterogeneity of the monetary transmission 
mechanism across the euro area. One of the main explanatory factors refers to the differences of 
the structure of the financial system among euro area members. In practice, many papers 
underlined that several characteristics of the national banking structures have a strong impact on 
the response of bank lending to a monetary policy decision. However, that implies that cross-
country differences in financial structure induce asymmetric effects in the context of a single 
monetary policy (Mojon, 2000). In conclusion, heterogeneity of the pass-through process implies 
different degrees of stickiness in the national retail banking markets across the euro area which 
in turn induce asymmetries in the transmission of the single monetary policy (de Bondt et al., 
2005). Moreover, de Bondt et al. (2005) categorize the underlying factors of the heterogeneity of 
the pass-though process. In particular they distinguish two main categories. The first category 
refers to the differences in macro financial structure which explain the cross-country differences 
in the pass-through process, whereas the second category refers to the micro financial structure, 
namely the link between retail bank interest rates and the banking market structure.  
It is a very interesting finding that that the pricing behaviour of banks reflects the degree of 
banking competition in the different segments of the retail banking market in the euro area. 
Indeed, the most critical factor that explains the persistence of the pass-through heterogeneity is 
the different degree of banking competition in the euro area (Sorensen & Werner, 2006). 
The issue of retail bank interest rate pass-through process has been deeply examined owing to its 
relevance to monetary policy conducted by the European Central Bank (ECB).  Most of these 
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studies point out an incomplete and heterogeneous pass-through process, not only across the 
members of euro area, but also across different retail banking products. Of course, the 
introduction of the common currency and the implementation of a common monetary policy 
result to a process towards to a more homogenous pass-through process and integrated retail 
banking market as well. Despite these development though, the transmission mechanism 
however remains heterogeneous and it produces asymmetric monetary policy effects. The 
available literature of this particular issue, as it has been aforementioned, places emphasis on the 
observed structural divergence of the national banking systems. A brief literature review of the 
pass-through heterogeneity in the euro area follows.  
One of the first studies before the introduction of the euro has been conducted by Cecchetti 
(1999) who highlighted the differences of the euro area banking systems in terms of size, 
concentration and health. He concluded that these features vary considerably among national 
banking systems. As a result he identified that euro area banks demonstrate a different degree of 
sensitivity to monetary policy changes and hence they respond differently resulting to 
asymmetries. Furthermore, Mojon (2000) examining the pass-through process in six large 
countries for the period before the introduction of the euro pointed out that the deregulation of 
the retail banking markets had a positive effect on the pass-through process. He affirmed though 
the heterogeneity of the adjustment of retail interest rates to monetary policy impulses. In 
particular Mojon highlighted four determinants of the pass-through heterogeneity, namely 
competition among banks, competition from direct finance, monetary policy regime and the 
rigidity of bank costs. Finally he argued that despite the expecting speed up of the pass-through 
process, the segmentation of the retail banking market would remain. Toolsema et al. (2001) in 
line with other studies identified convergence concerning the short and long-run response of 
lending rates to monetary policy. They also found weak evidence concerning the homogeneity of 
the of monetary policy transmission, despite the introduction of the single currency. Toolsema et 
al. argued that the pass-through process is likely to remain country-specific across the euro area 
inducing different lending rates. The paper of de Bondt (2002) places emphasis on the 
introduction of the single currency and documented that that the speed retail interest rate pass-
through is higher after 1999 mainly owing to increased competitive forces in banking industry. 
Moreover, Sander and Kleimeier (2004) also found that the speed of adjustment of retail interest 
rates is rigid and differs considerably across euro area countries. Sander and Kleimeier explained 
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the imperfect pass-through process focusing on the imperfect competitive market of the banking 
industry. Their paper, in contrast to other studies, argues first, that the pass-through of the retail 
interest rates stand incomplete even in the long-run, and second, that pre-EMU banking 
regulations had a more severe impact on pass-through in comparison to the introduction of the 
single currency. In particular, they argued that the heterogeneous banking environment is not 
likely to shift even in the long-run owing to persistent legal and cultural differences reflected on 
the divergence of national banking market structures. Sorensen & Warner (2006) investigated the 
pass-through process and they found evidence that confirm the suggestion of a sticky and 
incomplete pass-through. In particular they argued that the key factor that leads to the pass-
through heterogeneity is the different degree of competition among the euro area banking sector. 
The findings of Sorensen & Warner pointed out a fragmented and not fully integrated pass-
through, which is characterized though by an ongoing convergence and a more homogeneous 
retail banking market. Hristov et al. (2012) find that the pass-through process in retail bank rates 
became less complete during the crisis that heated the euro area as banks were reluctant to lower 
their rates despite the fact that the ECB cut its rates in response to financial crisis. So, an increase 
in interest rate spreads has been observed leading the ECB to implement unconventional policy 
measures. This implies a major obstacle of the transmission of monetary policy the ECB. The 
fact that banks of the euro area only partly passed-through the lower refinancing costs to their 
lending rates is considered to be a critical distortion of the transmission of monetary policy. 
So, the heterogeneity of the pass-through process and the fragmentation in the euro area retail 
markets are well documented as it has been presented. The lack of retail banking integration 
though is the result of impediments that that protect national retail banking markets from 
competition. It is critical to underline that according to economic theory it is assumed that under 
perfect competition retail interest rates would be adjusted in line to marginal costs. However, 
when banks have increased market power and hence in the presence of imperfect competition 
this assumption is not hold. Generally the degree of competition in banking market is measured 
against the benchmark of perfect competition. However, given the heterogeneity of the retail 
products, this is hardly the case in retail banking (Cabral et al., 2002). 
In particular, the European banking sector experienced major shifts and hence the conditions 
under which euro area banks compete have been altered. The liberalization of capital 
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movements, the financial deregulation, the technical advances and other elements are among the 
factors that influence the banking industry. The key development though in this context is the 
introduction of the euro that has fundamentally changed the cross-border banking regulatory 
framework as it has been assumed that that the EMU would intensify competition in the banking 
sector (Walkner and Raes, 2005). The initial expectations were very optimistic but the final 
outcome was rather disappointing. Indeed, despite the measures that have been taken the 
reinforcement of competition in the euro area retail banking markets had limited effects 
(Fernandez de Guevara et al., 2005). Indeed, one of the first papers that examine bank 
competition in the euro area is that of De Bandt and Davis (2000) which assessed competition in 
the banking markets of Germany, Italy and France. Their findings indicated a situation of 
monopolistic competition for large banks. Moreover, Bikker & Haaf (2002) provided strong 
evidence that banking markets in the euro area are characterized by monopolistic competition. 
This paper highlights that competition is stronger for the global-wide market for corporate 
banking, whereas it is weaker in retail local markets. Furthermore, Fernandez de Guevara et al. 
(2005) employing the Lerner index to describe banks’ market power also argue that the core part 
of the euro area banking industry functions under a situation of monopolistic competition. 
Furthermore, Van Leuvensteijn et al. (2008) examined the effects of competition on bank interest 
rates on loans and deposits. They argue that in the euro area countries bank interest rate spreads 
on core retail banking services, such as mortgage loans, consumer loans and short-term corporate 
loans, are lower in more competitive markets. This finding indicates that bank loan rates are 
lower and that monetary policy is transmitted faster to bank rates under strong competition. So, it 
is shown that bank competition has a significant impact on the monetary policy transmission 
mechanism. 
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6. Measuring retail banking integration 
The following part of the dissertation examines a prominent price-based indicator, namely the 
composite cost-of-borrowing indicator, which has been recently developed by the ECB. It is 
important to note that the ECB made the composite cost-of-borrowing indicator available to 
external users very recently in the end of 2013 and hence the contribution of this dissertation. 
This examination refers to the period from 2006 to 2013, namely an eight year period during 
which the eruption of the euro zone crisis took place having a strong negative impact on financial 
integration. The purpose of this research is to examine the course of the composite cost-of-
borrowing indicator in order to assess the divergence or convergence of retail interest rates 
across the euro area. If we observe a convergence of retail interest rates that would imply a more 
homogeneous and integrated euro area banking market, whereas a divergence would indicate a 
fragmented retail banking market.  
6.1 Methodology 
The prices of certain retail banking products in the euro area countries can offer insights into the 
course of financial integration. In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the monetary policy pass-
through process and the degree of financial integration across the euro area countries the ECB 
has developed an accurate and comparable measure for the borrowing costs of corporations and 
households. This measure is constructed by using detailed monetary financial institutions (MFI) 
interest rate statistics, which are considered the most reliable source of information for bank 
lending rates, in order to compute an indicator, namely the composite cost-of-borrowing 
indicator. This indicator actually consists of four categories of lending rates, namely total short-
term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and households, total long-term lending 
rates both for non-financial corporations and households, total lending rates to non-financial 
corporations and total lending rates both to households for house purchase. The composite cost-
of-borrowing indicator, apart from accurately assessing borrowing costs for non-financial 
corporations and households, also enhances and allows cross-country comparisons among the 
euro area members (ECB, 2013). So, this indicator is considered to be proper for examining and 
compare the convergence of retail interest rates across the euro zone. However, that fact that 
retail interest rates cannot be strictly comparable across the euro area is not ignored. As it has 
been aforementioned price based indicators have limitations. Price-based indicators though 
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depend on readily available data that are comparable across the euro area countries. Moreover, 
they are reliable owing to the sound statistical tools that the ECB employs. These indicators have 
been employed, apart from the Financial Integration Report of the ECB (2014), also from 
Darracq Paries et al. (2014).  
The methodology of computing the MFI interest rate statistics (used in composite cost-of-
borrowing indicator) refers to Annualized Agreed Rate (AAR) or Narrowly Defined Effective 
Rate (NDER). In particular, the AAR is defined as the interest rate that is individually agreed 
between monetary financial institutions and customers for retail banking products such as 
deposits and loans. These agreed interest rates are converted to an annual basis and quoted in 
percentages per annum. Annualized agreed rates cover all interest payments but they do not 
include other charges. On the other hand the Narrowly Defined Effective Rate is defined as the 
interest rate that equalises the present value of all future or existing payments agreed between 
monetary financial institutions and customers. The difference between Annualized Agreed Rate 
(AAR) and Narrowly Defined Effective Rate (NDER) rests on the implemented method for 
annualising interest payments. Under certain conditions the annualized agreed rate coincides 
with the narrowly defined effective rate (ECB, 2003).  
The research method of this dissertation refers to descriptive statistics which are used to describe 
the course of the data of particular retail interest rates in the euro area. Descriptive statistics 
combined with graphical analysis, provide a simple presentation of the observations that have 
been made during the period 2006-2013. In the context of this dissertation descriptive statistics 
form the basis of a simple description of retail interest rates divergence, whereas inferential 
statistics are beyond the scope of this dissertation. Moreover, given the dispersion between the 
euro area retail banking interest rates, descriptive statistics are accompanied by the estimation of 
the standard deviation, which measures the dispersion from the mean value of the data set. 
Furthermore, mean, maximum and minimum values of the data set are presented in the 
Appendix. The values of the aforementioned statistics have been calculated using Excel. The 
data of composite cost-of-borrowing indicators are provided by the ECB’s Statistical Data 
Warehouse available via the website http://sdw.ecb.europa.eu. According to its policy of free 
access, ECB releases its statistics and related methodologies that can be downloaded via its 
online data delivery service. 
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6.2 Results 
In the Appendix Tables 1-4 present the data for the set of composite cost-of-borrowing 
indicators, namely total short-term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and 
households, total long-term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and households, 
total lending rates to non-financial corporations and total lending rates both to households for 
house purchase. These tables are followed by Graphs 1-8 that depict the standard deviation and 
lending rates divergence as well. 
The available data, presented at Tables in the Appendix, show that the course of the convergence 
of composite cost-of-borrowing indicators until the beginning of the European economic crisis in 
September 2008 after the default of Lehman Brothers, was satisfactory. Indeed, the rates charged 
by euro zone MFIs to households and to non-financial corporations recorded a low level of 
dispersion as a certain degree of heterogeneity was still persisting as a result of euro area 
domestic banking systems’ multiple differences (regulatory and fiscal framework, degree of 
banking competition, economic cycle phase etc.). We observe that in all categories of composite 
cost-of-borrowing indicators standard deviation ranged from 0.40 to 0.64 during the period 2006-
2008. 
This situation though has been suddenly worsened after the eruption of the crisis. This crisis 
incident has further fragmented the financial markets of the euro area. Indeed, descriptive 
statistics show that standard deviation is gradually broadening. In particular standard deviation of 
total short-term cost of borrowing after 2008 has been more than doubled from 0.50 in 2008 to 
1.16 in 2009. The relatively low standard deviation of this indicator until 2008, indicating that 
lending rates tend to be close to the mean, turned to a higher standard deviation indicating that 
lending rates spread out over a larger range of values. It is important that this trend is observed 
through the whole crisis period with the exception of 2013 that a small decrease of standard 
deviation took place reaching 1.45. Moreover, total long-term cost of borrowing follows the 
same pattern. The value of standard deviation has been increased from 0.64 in 2008 to 1.07 in 
2009. The following period is characterized by high but fluctuating values. It should be noticed 
though that the increase of standard deviation in that case is not so large in comparison to the 
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increase of total short-term cost of borrowing. It is plausibly to argue that in a situation of 
growing uncertainty short term loan instruments reflect risks better than long term instruments. 
In addition, the value standard deviation of total lending rates to non-financial corporations has 
also been suddenly increased after 2008 from 0.58 to 1.21. This increase has also been very big 
and lending rates spread has been gradually increasing until 2013 that a small reduction is 
observed. In 2012 standard deviation reached its pick value of 1.59. On the contrary standard 
deviation of total lending rates both to households for house purchase has been affected less 
intensively. After the eruption of the crisis the value of standard deviation of lending rates spread 
has been almost doubled from 0.5 in 2008 to 0.98 in 2009. In the following years though, a 
gradual reduction is observed.  
Overall descriptive statistics findings are in line with the available literature (European Central 
Bank, 2014; Hristov, et al., 2012; Rughoo & Sarantis, 2014) that points out the fact that after the 
crisis eruption retail interest rates have been further diverged. The Graphs 1-8 in the Appendix 
display in a more comprehensive way the numerical data of the Tables. In particular after 2008 
we observe an abrupt upsurge in all categories of composite cost-of-borrowing indicators 
standard deviation. In the following years 2009-2013 the values of standard deviation are still 
considerably higher in comparison to the pre-crisis period 2006-2008.  We also observe the 
negative impact of economic crisis after 2008 on the course of mean, maximum and minimum 
values of in all categories of composite cost-of-borrowing indicators standard deviation. These 
values are presented at Graphs 9-12 in the Appendix.  
Given the rapid deterioration of country risk factors and sovereign debt spreads in many euro 
area countries, such as Greece, Ireland, Cyprus, Portugal etc., the divergence of retail bank 
lending rates appear to be plausible. The law of one price may disregards this kind of variables, 
but the divergence of lending rates can be explained referring to these factors which had a strong 
impact on bank lending rates in some countries. These findings are very important not only in the 
context of monetary policy transmission mechanism. The increase of lending rates after the crisis 
emergence in 2008 was substantial for some member countries. In some cases it was questioned 
if domestic banks could even fulfill their key function, namely the provision of credit to the real 
economy.  
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Conclusions  
This dissertation examined several issues that refer to the complicated and multi-dimensional 
topic of retail interest rate differentials across the euro area domestic banking markets. It 
provides a framework that examines retail interest rate differentials from multiple prospects that 
encompass the pass-through process, bank competition and monetary policy. Overall, we 
describe the picture of a considerable heterogeneous retail banking market in the euro area, while 
its main contribution refers to the descriptive statistics of very recently data (December 2013).  
The main finding of this dissertation, grounded on the literature review, the assessment of the 
current situation of retail banking integration and the quantitative research, is that euro area retail 
banking market remains highly fragmented, while strong national characteristics are still in 
place. The dispersion of retail interest rates across the euro area countries reflects the strong local 
nature of retail banking activities. Despite the fact that the EMU has been launched in 1999 the 
progress that has been made towards banking integration is not significant. Moreover, the recent 
and still unfolding economic crisis of the euro zone had a further negative effect on retail interest 
rates divergence.  
Summarizing this dissertation it can be argued that national banking markets in the euro area 
remain heterogeneous and domestic banks behave in a different way resulting. The divergence of 
retail interest rates reflects this multi-dimensional heterogeneity. This fact implies that banks 
respond differently to monetary policy impulses and hence retail interest rate pass-through 
process is incomplete. This failure signals an asymmetric monetary policy. While legal and 
regulatory barriers have been removed in the euro area retail banking activities maintain a strong 
local nature. In this framework, considering the law of one price, retail banking integration is 
hardly likely to emerge. So, it is not surprising that retail interest rates vary considerably across 
countries as the findings of composite cost-of-borrowing indicator descriptive statistics show.  
In the event of the crisis it is worth mentioning that the heterogeneity and the fragmentation of 
euro area banking markets did not allow a euro area wide credit crunch. The pluralistic structure 
of euro area banking and the lack of considerable cross border banking activities did not favor 
the contagion of financial distress across the euro area. So the pluralism and the diversity of 
30 
 
Europe’s retail banking sector implies risk diversification that protected its soundness and 
secured the supply of credit. Overall, the debate over the integration of the euro area retail 
banking sector, which was major part of the political agenda after the completion of the Financial 
Services Action Plan, has been loosened during the financial crisis. This kind of discussion on 
market integration though is expected to be revived when European economy is restored. 
However, this crisis represents a major lesson for policy makers who have altered the way that 
they conceive the process of European integration including retail banking sector. 
Currently the euro area banking sector undergoes major reforms in line with the gradual building 
of a European banking union. Moving towards a sound banking union that would separate banks 
form sovereigns it is likely that would have a positive impact on retail banking market 
integration. However, this step towards deeper integration runs against the will of many 
European countries. In this context, it is suggested that further research should focus on the 
impact of the agreement on the establishment of a Single Supervisory Mechanism and a Single 
Resolution Mechanism for banks towards the creation of the banking union.  
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Appendix  
 
Table 1. Total short-term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and households 
(2006-2013) 
  Total short-term cost of borrowing 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AUSTRIA 4,03 5,03 5,41 2,77 2,27 2,77 2,26 2,00 
BELGIUM 4,01 5,15 5,44 2,61 2,26 2,83 2,35 2,25 
CYPRUS     6,53 6,29 5,79 6,41 6,58 6,03 
GERMANY 4,61 5,57 5,74 3,47 3,08 3,43 2,85 2,46 
ESTONIA 4,66 5,76 6,26 4,67 4,18 4,11 3,35 2,96 
SPAIN 4,03 5,15 5,63 3,03 2,74 3,64 3,53 3,51 
FINLAND 3,82 4,87 5,14 2,36 1,97 2,62 2,12 2,02 
FRANCE 3,93 4,94 5,31 2,55 2,15 2,77 2,28 1,91 
GREECE 5,48 6,16 6,58 4,79 5,04 6,24 6,24 5,85 
IRELAND 4,59 5,69 6,02 3,34 3,26 3,74 3,38 3,38 
ITALY 4,71 5,48 5,98 3,52 2,90 3,64 4,10 3,98 
LUXEMBOURG 4,02 4,92 5,00 2,52 2,59 2,73 2,00 1,76 
MALTA     5,94 4,74 4,71 4,57 4,30 4,27 
NETHERLANDS 4,16 5,09 5,36 2,83 2,50 2,99 2,43 2,22 
PORTUGAL 4,97 5,79 6,44 4,41 4,20 5,73 6,05 5,55 
SLOVENIA 4,27 5,44 6,35 5,40 5,01 5,14 4,85 4,75 
SLOVAKIA     5,60 3,37 3,42 3,60 2,87 2,65 
AVERAGE 4,38 5,36 5,81 3,69 3,42 3,94 3,62 3,39 
MINIMUM 3,82 4,87 5,00 2,36 1,97 2,62 2,00 1,76 
MAXIMUM 5,48 6,16 6,58 6,29 5,79 6,41 6,58 6,03 
STANDARD DEVIATION 0,47 0,40 0,50 1,16 1,18 1,25 1,51 1,45 
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Graph 1. Standard deviation of total short-term lending rates both for non-financial 
corporations and households (2006-2013) 
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Graph 2. Total short-term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and 
households (2006-2013) 
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Table 2. Total long-term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and households 
(2006-2013) 
  Total long-term cost of borrowing 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AUSTRIA 3,57 4,31 4,78 3,82 3,28 3,34 3,21 2,93 
BELGIUM 4,26 4,90 5,24 3,53 3,02 3,46 3,57 3,46 
CYPRUS     6,31 6,25 4,66 5,05 5,30 4,64 
GERMANY 4,58 5,13 5,31 4,38 3,82 3,96 3,15 2,83 
ESTONIA 5,38 6,17 6,52 5,36 4,59 4,69 4,12 3,59 
SPAIN 4,19 5,34 5,60 3,32 3,36 4,10 4,19 4,26 
FINLAND 4,50 5,10 5,25 4,04 3,39 3,50 2,63 2,87 
FRANCE 3,95 4,60 5,15 4,26 3,58 3,87 3,80 3,21 
GREECE 4,61 4,78 4,99 4,99 4,73 4,74 3,24 2,70 
IRELAND 4,52 5,27 5,55 3,54 3,50 4,55 4,62 4,74 
ITALY 4,61 5,52 5,79 4,45 3,74 4,23 4,75 4,51 
LUXEMBOURG 4,10 4,96 4,91 2,76 2,21 2,95 2,50 2,45 
MALTA     5,17 3,87 3,59 3,81 3,02 2,90 
NETHERLANDS 4,51 5,03 5,32 4,92 4,49 4,59 4,26 3,88 
PORTUGAL 5,33 5,88 6,62 5,41 6,02 6,54 5,63 5,21 
SLOVENIA 5,25 5,99 6,88 6,07 4,77 5,41 5,50 5,35 
SLOVAKIA     6,02 6,36 5,26 4,80 4,73 4,05 
AVERAGE 4,53 5,21 5,61 4,55 4,00 4,33 4,01 3,74 
MINIMUM 3,57 4,31 4,78 2,76 2,21 2,95 2,50 2,45 
MAXIMUM 5,38 6,17 6,88 6,36 6,02 6,54 5,63 5,35 
STANDARD DEVIATION 0,52 0,53 0,64 1,07 0,93 0,87 0,98 0,92 
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Graph 3. Standard deviation of total long-term lending rates both for non-financial 
corporations and households (2006-2013) 
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Graph 4. Total long-term lending rates both for non-financial corporations and households 
(2006-2013) 
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Table 3. Total lending rates to non-financial corporations (2006-2013) 
  Total cost of borrowing to non-financial corporations 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AUSTRIA 4,01 5,01 5,38 2,76 2,29 2,79 2,27 2,01 
BELGIUM 4,04 5,15 5,44 2,62 2,27 2,83 2,40 2,28 
CYPRUS     6,75 6,49 6,11 6,73 6,95 6,30 
GERMANY 4,59 5,51 5,70 3,57 3,15 3,49 2,89 2,51 
ESTONIA 5,02 5,93 6,50 5,00 4,52 4,52 3,71 3,16 
SPAIN 4,04 5,17 5,62 3,03 2,81 3,70 3,59 3,58 
FINLAND 3,98 5,00 5,22 2,43 2,02 2,71 2,22 2,08 
FRANCE 3,97 4,96 5,33 2,91 2,46 3,03 2,59 2,17 
GREECE 5,74 6,48 6,71 4,92 5,21 6,46 6,57 6,25 
IRELAND 4,97 6,06 6,33 3,47 3,35 4,03 3,66 3,61 
ITALY 4,74 5,50 5,99 3,56 2,94 3,70 4,13 4,01 
LUXEMBOURG 4,02 4,93 5,00 2,52 2,60 2,74 2,00 1,76 
MALTA     6,12 4,97 4,82 4,69 4,50 4,48 
NETHERLANDS 4,25 5,12 5,34 2,94 2,57 3,08 2,52 2,36 
PORTUGAL 5,20 6,04 6,68 4,74 4,52 6,08 6,25 5,64 
SLOVENIA 4,22 5,41 6,34 5,46 5,12 5,24 4,98 4,85 
SLOVAKIA     5,60 3,35 3,34 3,54 2,82 2,62 
AVERAGE 4,49 5,45 5,89 3,81 3,54 4,08 3,77 3,51 
MINIMUM 3,97 4,93 5,00 2,43 2,02 2,71 2,00 1,76 
MAXIMUM 5,74 6,48 6,75 6,49 6,11 6,73 6,95 6,30 
STANDARD DEVIATION 0,57 0,50 0,58 1,21 1,25 1,34 1,59 1,52 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
 
Graph 5. Standard deviation of total lending rates to non-financial corporations (2006-
2013) 
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Graph 6. Total lending rates to non-financial corporations (2006-2013) 
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Table 4. Total lending rates to households for house purchase (2006-2013) 
  Total cost of borrowing to households for house purchase 
  2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
AUSTRIA 3,83 4,75 5,30 3,69 2,72 2,86 2,72 2,39 
BELGIUM 4,08 4,71 5,09 4,25 3,59 3,81 3,63 3,45 
CYPRUS     5,79 5,69 4,42 5,05 5,18 4,88 
GERMANY 4,63 5,10 5,21 4,26 3,73 3,87 3,10 2,80 
ESTONIA 4,26 5,53 5,82 3,98 3,39 3,44 2,96 2,73 
SPAIN 4,06 5,09 5,67 4,25 2,51 3,34 3,27 2,99 
FINLAND 3,69 4,71 5,02 2,42 1,98 2,48 1,97 2,01 
FRANCE 3,81 4,42 5,02 4,39 3,64 3,80 3,76 3,18 
GREECE 4,28 4,49 4,83 4,37 3,88 4,32 3,21 2,81 
IRELAND 4,01 4,91 5,18 3,11 3,04 3,50 3,36 3,41 
ITALY 4,35 5,35 5,63 4,12 3,13 3,31 3,96 3,69 
LUXEMBOURG 3,95 4,74 4,90 2,49 2,16 2,41 2,23 2,13 
MALTA     4,97 3,43 3,41 3,37 3,38 3,22 
NETHERLANDS 4,34 4,97 5,36 4,96 4,52 4,56 4,29 3,78 
PORTUGAL 4,03 4,80 5,43 2,78 2,54 3,76 3,89 3,25 
SLOVENIA 5,41 6,13 6,73 4,45 3,34 3,77 3,37 3,20 
SLOVAKIA     6,12 5,89 5,17 4,83 4,74 4,10 
AVERAGE 4,20 4,98 5,42 4,03 3,36 3,68 3,47 3,18 
MINIMUM 3,69 4,42 4,83 2,42 1,98 2,41 1,97 2,01 
MAXIMUM 5,41 6,13 6,73 5,89 5,17 5,05 5,18 4,88 
STANDARD DEVIATION 0,43 0,45 0,50 0,98 0,85 0,73 0,81 0,71 
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Graph 7. Standard deviation of total lending rates to households for house purchase (2006-
2013) 
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Graph 8. Total lending rates to households for house purchase (2006-2013) 
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Graph 9. Mean, maximum and minimum of total short-term lending rates both for non-
financial corporations and households (2006-2013) 
 
 
 
Graph 10. Mean, maximum and minimum of total long-term lending rates both for non-
financial corporations and households (2006-2013) 
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Graph 11. Mean, maximum and minimum of Total lending rates to non-financial 
corporations (2006-2013) 
 
 
 
Graph 12. Mean, maximum and minimum of total lending rates to households for house 
purchase (2006-2013) 
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